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PROTECTION OF CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES
UNDER 42 U.S.C. SECTION 1985(3): OPERATION
RESCUE'S "SUMMER OF MERCY"
"[I]f you believe abortion is murder, you must act like it's murder." '
These words, uttered by Randall Terry, the National Director and Founder
of the antiabortion group Operation Rescue, are but one example of the
intensity and passion that continue to permeate the abortion debate. 2 Although the Supreme Court has long revered freedom of speech and freedom
of association, 3 when such rights incite unlawful conspiratorial actions

1. Nightline: Kansas Judge vs. Operation Rescue and Bush Administration (ABC
television broadcast, Aug. 6, 1991) (statement attributed to Randall Terry) [hereinafter Nightline] (unofficial transcript of television show available on LEXIS, Nexis library). During a
recent talk show appearance, Randall Terry ended the interview on a highly emotional note
crying "Abortion is murder! If we don't bring an end to it, our country is going to be
destroyed!" Randall Terry on Donahue: War in Wichita: Pro-Life versus Pro-Choice at 16
(Multimedia Entertainment television broadcast, Sept. 6, 1991) [hereinafter Donahue].
2. See Susan B. Apel, OperationRescue and the Necessity Defense: Beginning a Feminist
Deconstruction,48 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 41, 41 n.1 (1991) (noting that Randall Terry founded
Operation Rescue); See NOW v. Operation Rescue, 726 F. Supp. 1483, 1488 (E.D. Va. 1989)
(recognizing Randall Terry as Operation Rescue's National Director), aff'd, 914 F.2d 582 (4th
Cir. 1990), cert. granted sub nom. Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 111 S.Ct.
1070 (1991). Operation Rescue is an association whose immediate goal is the prevention of
abortions and whose ultimate goal is the eventual illegalization of abortions. See NOW, 914
F.2d at 584 (describing organizational purposes of Operation Rescue). As defined in the
antiabortion organization's literature, "rescues" entail "physically blockading abortion mills
with [human] bodies, to intervene between abortionists and the innocent victims." NOW, 726
F. Supp. at 1488 (quoting from pamphlet entitled OPERATION REscUe, NATIONAL DAY OF
REscuE-OCToBER 29, 1988). The purpose of these "rescues" is to shut down the targeted
facilities completely. See id. (noting that design of rescue demonstrations is to prevent abortion
clinic facilities from operating). Because Operation Rescue members truly believe that abortion
is the brutal murder of innocent children, they do not hesitate risking their bodies during the
demonstrations. See Donahue, supra note 1, at 3 (describing actions of Operation Rescue
demonstrators during abortion clinic blockades). Although the current debate centers around
the prevention of abortions only, Randall Terry and Operation Rescue's ultimate agenda
includes the illegalization of so-called abortifacient devices including the birth control pill and
the intrauterine device or IUD. Id. at 4. According to Terry, because the medical community
does not view the condom as an abortive form of contraception, in the eyes of Operation
Rescue, its use is permissible. Id. at 5.
This Note focuses on the activities of the antiabortion group Operation Rescue because
of its highly controversial tactic of blockading access to abortion clinics beginning during the
1988 Democratic National Convention held in Atlanta, Georgia. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABsoLuTms 172 (1990) (discussing Operation Rescue). This Note does
not assess any of the civil disobedience or free speech issues associated with the tactics
employed by the organization in its nationwide effort to prevent abortions. For a discussion
of such topics, see John W. Whitehead, Civil Disobedience and OperationRescue: A Historical
and Theoretical Analysis, 48 WAsH. & LEE L. REv. 77 (1991).

3. See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958) (noting that Fourteenth Amendment embraces freedom of speech and recognizing close nexus between freedom of speech and
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designed to infringe upon other constitutionally protected rights, it is not
only the province but also the duty of the federal judiciary to remedy the
situation.

4

The date is July 15, 1991, and the setting is Wichita, Kansas, a city
that is rife with antiabortion support.s The main players and their actions
include Operation Rescue members blockading abortion clinics; women
seeking entrance into abortion clinics; the Justice Department and the Bush
Administration arguing that federal law does not protect women from such
conspiratorial activities; and District Judge Patrick Kelly, attempting to
maintain law and order in the city of Wichita. 6 Dubbed the "Summer of
Mercy," Operation Rescue's antiabortion blockades lasted forty-two days
and successfully prevented twenty-nine abortions. 7 On August 5, 1991, Judge

freedom of assembly). In NAACP, the Supreme Court emphasized the importance of the
freedom to associate for the advancement of beliefs and ideas by describing the freedom as
an inseparable aspect of the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Id. In addition, the Court pointed out that any evidence of state action having
a chilling effect on the freedom to assemble is subject to the closest judicial scrutiny. Id. at
460-61.
4. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (noting that federal judiciary is supreme
authority on interpreting Constitution and that by oath, Article VI, clause 3, solemnly
commands judicial officers to support Constitution); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch)
137, 177 (1803) (stating principle that "[ilt is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is."); see also Nightline, supra note 1 (recognizing inherent
judicial power to preserve peace). According to Professor Tribe, the federal judiciary has the
inherent power to issue injunctions in order to maintain law and order. Id. He bases his
argument in part on the 1957 incident in Little Rock, Arkansas during which President
Eisenhower called upon the United States marshals to enforce the federal court decision calling
for the integration of public school systems nationwide. Id.; see Cooper, 358 U.S. at 9-12
(describing Little Rock incident in detail). Consequently, Professor Tribe criticizes the Justice
Department for taking the "legally irresponsible position that the [district] court is without
jurisdiction to preserve the peace." Nightline, supra note 1.
As Judge Kelly emphatically stressed, Operation Rescue members have every right to
demonstrate and promote their cause; however, as Operation Rescue members admitted, their
purpose in Wichita was not to protest, but to close abortion clinics down. Id.; see Women's
Health Care Servs. v. Operation Rescue, No. 91-1303-K at 2 (D. Kan. Aug. 5, 1991) (order
granting preliminary injunction) (noting that potential damage to plaintiffs and their patients
resulting from defendants' conspiracy greatly outweighs any potential damage to defendants
from enforcing preliminary injunction); Mimi Hall, Justices ConsiderAbortion Foes' Tactics:
Protesters Want State Jurisdiction, USA TODAY, Oct. 17, 1991, at 6A (noting that abortion
rights supporters believe federal courts should step in when local authorities are ineffective in
stopping Operation Rescue demonstrators' intimidation of women seeking abortions).
5. See Eric Harrison, 25,000 Abortion Opponents Cap Wichita Protests;Rally: Speakers
Call on Residents to Continue Their Opposition. Operation Rescue Is Leaving the City., L.A.
Tinas, Aug. 26, 1991, at A14 (noting date in which Operation Rescue's "Summer of Mercy"
protests began); Mimi Hall & Steve Wieberg, U.S. Joins Wichita Abortion Fray: Kansas Town
'Tied Up' by Fierce Debate, USA TODAY, Aug. 7, 1991, at 1A (reporting that at least one
reason for Operation Rescue's selection of Wichita, Kansas as setting for "Summer of Mercy"
was because of apparent public sympathy towards antiabortion movement).
6. See Nightline, supra note 1 (listing main parties involved in "Summer of Mercy"
antiabortion protests).
7. See David Maraniss, Lessons of a Summer of Abortion Protests, WASH. PosT, Aug.
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Kelly granted a preliminary injunction pursuant to section 1985(3) of the
United States Code' in favor of two organizations and a doctor providing
abortion services in Wichita that Operation Rescue targeted during its
summer demonstrations. 9 Although in issuing the injunction Judge Kelly
restricted certain Operation Rescue activities,10 he emphasized the fact that
the relief did not infringe upon Operation Rescue members' legitimate rights
to free speech.' Judge Kelly found that the antiabortion protesters were
conspiring to prevent clinic patients and staff from gaining access to abortion
facilities and that such conspiratorial activities warranted his decision to
enjoin the protesters. 12 However, when Judge Kelly brought federal marshals

26, 1991, at Al (describing Operation Rescue's activities in Wichita during "Summer of
Mercy"). During the antiabortion protests, Operation Rescue reportedly shut down Wichita's
three abortion clinics. Isabel Wilkerson, Drive Against Abortion Finds a Symbol: Wichita,
N.Y. Tbms (Special to N.Y. Tas), Aug. 4, 1991, § 1, at 20.
8. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1988).
9. See Women's Health Care Servs. v. Operation Rescue, No. 91-1303-K at 2 (D. Kan.
Aug. 5, 1991) (order granting plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1985(3)). Judge Kelly granted the preliminary injunction based upon the finding that
absent the requested relief, the plaintiffs would suffer immediate and irreparable injury due
to Operation Rescue's abortion clinic blockade activities. Id.
10. Id. at 2-4. Specifically, Judge Kelly's injunction enjoined Operation Rescue demonstrators from:
a. trespassing on, sitting in, blocking, impeding or obstructing ingress into or egress
from any facility at which abortions, family planning, or gynecological services are
provided by plaintiffs in Wichita, Kansas;
b. harassing, intimidating or physically abusing persons entering, leaving, working
at, or using any services at any facility at which abortions, family planning or
gynecological services are provided by plaintiffs in Wichita, Kansas; provided,
however, that: (1) "sidewalk counseling" of a reasonably quiet conversation of a
nonthreatening nature by not more than two persons with the person they are seeking
to counsel shall not be prohibited if limited to public sidewalks; (2) no one is
required to accept or listen to "sidewalk counseling," and should anyone decline
such counseling, that person shall have the absolute right to leave or walk away
without harassment; and (3) "sidewalk counseling" as defined herein shall not limit
the right of the Wichita Police Department or the United States Marshal to maintain
public order by reasonably necessary rules and regulations which they decide are
necessary at any particular demonstration site;
c. obstructing the work of the persons located in any facility at which abortions,
family planning or gynecological services are provided by the plaintiffs in Wichita,
Kansas, by producing noise by any means-including singing, chanting, yelling,
shouting, or screaming-that substantially interferes with the provision of medical
services, including counseling, within any such facility;
d. inducing, encouraging, or directing others to take any of the actions described in
paragraphs a.-c. above;
e. trespassing upon, sitting in, blocking, impeding or obstructing ingress into or
egress from 16966 Citation Road, in Butler County, Kansas;
f. harassing or intimidating or physically abusing Dr. George R. Tiller and his
family.
Id.
11. Id. at 4.
12. Id. at 2.
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into Kansas to enforce both the preliminary injunction and a previously

issued restraining order, there were cries from many, including the Justice
Department, that Kelly had abused his discretion.

3

Upon the issuance of

the preliminary injunction, counsel for Operation Rescue confidently filed4
for an emergency appeal, requesting a stay of the equitable relief granted.'
On August 23, 1991, however, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit upheld Judge Kelly's decision to grant the motion for prelim-

inary injunctive relief.' 56 Currently the parties are preparing for disposition

of the case on appeal.'
Operation Rescue's summer demonstrations in Wichita resulting in Judge
Kelly's injunction represent the culmination of the legal dispute over whether
courts have jurisdiction to grant injunctive relief under section 1985(3) in
the context of abortion clinic blockades. In light of the absence of adequate
common-law remedies and the history and development of the statute,
section 1985(3) should apply to protect women in abortion clinic blockade
cases. The class-based animus requirement of section 1985(3) is met in this
area because conspiring to prevent women from obtaining abortions is a
form of gender discrimination. Therefore, section 1985(3) should apply to
protect the constitutional rights implicated in the clinic blockade context.
Although there is a state action requirement to protect privacy rights under
section 1985(3), the peculiar circumstances associated with abortion clinic
blockades call for a minimal showing of state activity to satisfy the requirement. This Note concludes that the right to privacy deserves federal protection from private conspiracies and that section 1985(3) is the proper
mechanism for providing such relief.

13. See Nightline, supra note 1 (reporting that in issuing injunction, Judge Kelly had
taken law into his own hands). The Justice Department expresses the view that § 1985(3), a
Reconstruction Era civil rights law used to protect blacks from racial harassment, does not
protect women seeking abortions. U.S. Backs Wichita Abortion Protesters, N.Y. Tas, Aug.
7, 1991, at A10, col. 4 [hereinafter U.S. Backs Protesters]. Despite the Justice Department's
denial that it has taken any position on the tactics of Operation Rescue, prochoice advocates
strongly disagree, stating that the Justice Department supports "terror and lawlessness instead
of rights and liberties." Id. (quoting Kate Michelman, executive director of National Abortion
Right Action League). Law enforcement officials arrested over 2,700 protesters during the
antiabortion demonstrations for failure to obey Judge Kelly's injunction. See Hall, supra note
4 (reporting Wichita arrest statistics stemming from Operation Rescue abortion clinic blockade
activities).
14. See Maraniss, supra note 7 (reporting Operation Rescue's confident feeling that
United States Court of Appeals would overturn Judge Kelly's injunction).
15. See 84 Wichita Abortion Protesters Arrested; Blockade Ban Upheld, L.A. TMo,
Aug. 24, 1991, at A20 (reporting that appeals court upheld district court's protection order).
16. Telephone interview with Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit (Oct. 4, 1991). In addition to filing the emergency appeal for an automatic stay of
Judge Kelly's preliminary injunction, Operation Rescue has appealed to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit the decision granting the preliminary injunction. Id.
The Tenth Circuit has yet to schedule the case for hearing and the case's status is pending.
Id. Both parties have yet to file their briefs. Id.
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I.

REMEDIES IN THE CONTEXT OF ABORTION CLmc

BLOCKADES

Operation Rescue and its supporters argue that the proper forum for
17
relief in the context of abortion clinic blockades is the state court system.
Such a contention is somewhat misleading, however, because in assuming
that federal court jurisdiction turns upon whether or not the state court
system provides adequate remedies to the aggrieved parties, the argument
ignores the possibility of a choice of forum. Furthermore, absent section
1985(3) protection, women seeking abortions would have no opportunity to
enforce their constitutionally protected rights against private conspiratorial
infringement regardless of the forum. 18
During oral arguments before the Supreme Court in NOW v. Operation
Rescue,' 9 Deputy Solicitor General John G. Roberts, Jr., of the Justice
Department emphasized that because state law remedies afford relief to
those targeted by the protests, federal judges should not hear complaints
regarding abortion clinic blockades." However, in the case of conspiracies
designed to infringe upon the constitutional right to privacy and, more
specifically, the fundamental right to have an abortion, state court remedies
2
are inadequate because they do not directly provide relief for women. '
During the oral arguments, counsel for NOW recognized the inadequacy of
relief in the context of widespread abortion clinic blockades?22 Women
seeking abortions do not have a trespass claim against the demonstrators
because the women do not own the blockaded property.? Furthermore, a

17. See 60 U.S.L.W. 3331, 3332 (U.S. Nov. 5, 1991) (noting that plaintiffs in abortion
clinic blockade cases have state law remedies).
18. But see John H. Henn & Maria Del Monaco, Civil Rights and RICO: Stopping
Operation Rescue, 13 HAtv. WOMEN'S L.J. 251, 268-77 (1990) (recognizing and describing
application of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) in context of
abortion clinic blockades).
19. 914 F.2d 582 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. granted sub nom. Bray v. Alexandria Women's
Health Clinic, II S. Ct. 1070 (1991). Oral arguments in NOW v. Operation Rescue took
place on Ocftober 16, 1991. For purposes of this Note, the author cites to the case as either
NOW v. Operation Rescue or NOW even when referring to oral arguments made before the
Supreme Court under the name Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic.
20. 60 U.S.L.W. 3331, 3332, (U.S. Nov. 5, 1991).
21. See infra notes 22-26 and accompanying text (recognizing deficiencies of state law
remedies in addressing harm caused to women by abortion clinic blockades).
22. See Ruth Marcus, Use of KKK Law Against Antiabortion ProtestersArgued Before
Court, WAsH. PosT, Oct. 17, 1991, at All (noting inadequacies of bringing suit based on
trespass or interference with contractual relationship in cases involving abortion clinic blockades). Counsel for NOW, John G. Shafer argued to the Supreme Court that state law remedies
were inadequate in handling large abortion clinic protests for a number of reasons. Id. For
example, because a woman does not own the blockaded property, she has no trespass action.
Id. Also, because she does not know any of the names of the demonstrators, she has no
action for interference with a contractual relationship. Id.
23. See Hall, supra note 4 (recognizing inherent deficiencies of state law remedies in
abortion clinic blockade cases). During oral arguments in NOW v. Operation Rescue, counsel
for NOW stressed the significant inadequacies of state law remedies such as trespass, public
nuisance, and tortious interference with business relationships as applied to women seeking
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suit based upon a contractual interference or tortious interference with
business relationship theory is not feasible because of the number of
nameless protesters involved in the blockades2
When Operation Rescue denies women access to abortion clinics, the
women risk losing more than the power to exercise their constitutionally
protected right to travel interstate or right to choose. For instance, shutting

down abortion facilities creates a substantial risk of patients suffering from
physical or mental harm. 25 Physically, patients who elect to use a preabortion laminaria for dilation purposes require timely removal of the device
in order to avoid infections associated with prolonged insertion while
mentally, patients must endure the stress and anxiety associated with the
abortion clinic blockades. 26 Therefore, although a state court system can

provide a remedy against abortion clinic blockades by means of a trespass
action, the relief targets the property owners and is not specifically directed
to women seeking abortions. 27 Because women seeking abortions have no
direct relief under common law, the need for protection under section
1985(3) is apparent.2
II. THE

HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF SECTION

1985(3)

Section 1985 is a federal statute providing relief against private conspiracies designed to deprive any person or class of persons from equal

protection under the laws. 29 Enacted in 1871, along with other Reconstruc-

abortions. Id. Emphasizing the inadequacies of state law, counsel asked the Court: "For a
young lady trapped in a car, bleeding, in a parking lot, would she have a trespass action?"
Id.
24. See Marcus, supra note 22 (noting inadequacies of relief under state law).
25. NOW v. Operation Rescue, 726 F. Supp. 1483, 1489 (E.D. Va. 1989), aff'd, 914
F.2d 582 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. granted sub nom. Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic,
111 S. Ct. 1070 (1991).
26. Id.
27. See supra notes 22-26 and accompanying text (discussing inadequacies of relief under
state law as applied to women).
28. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) (recognizing that every
individual who suffers injury has right to claim protection of laws). The Court reasoned in
Marbury that, because the government of the United States consisted of laws and not of men,
the system needed to furnish a remedy for any violation of a vested legal right in order to
preserve the integrity of the government. Id.
29. See 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (1988) (describing overall statute as addressing conspiracies
designed to interfere with civil rights and dividing statute into three situational sections). The
applicable part used in the abortion protest context is § 1985(3) which provides in full:
If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire or go in disguise on the
highway or on the premises of another, for the purpose of depriving, either directly
or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or
of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; or for the purpose of preventing
or hindering the constituted authorities of any State or Territory from giving or
securing to all persons within such State or Territory the equal protection of the
laws; or if two or more persons conspire to prevent by force, intimidation, or threat,
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tion Era civil rights statutes, section 1985(3) originally attempted to protect
black citizens from conspiratorial Ku Klux Klan activities.30 In 1951 the
Supreme Court determined that the language of section 1985(3) reached
only conspiracies involving state action.3 However, twenty years later, in
Griffin v. Breckenridge,32 the Court held that in certain contexts the statute
could reach private conspiracies as well. 33 In Griffin, the Court explained
that limiting the reach of section 1985(3) solely to instances involving state
conspiratorial action was an unnecessarily narrow interpretation of the

any citizen who is lawfully entitled to vote, from giving his support or advocacy in
a legal manner, toward or in favor of the election of any lawfully qualified person
as an elector for President or Vice President, or as a Member of Congress of the
United States; or to injure any citizen in person or property on account of such
support or advocacy; in any case of conspiracy set forth in this section, if one or
more person engaged therein do, or cause to be done, any act in furtherance of the
object of such conspiracy, whereby another is injured in his person or property, or
deprived of having and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the United
States, the party so injured or deprived may have an action for the recovery of
damages occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against any one or more of the
conspirators.
Id.
30. See Henn & Del Monaco, supra note 18, at 252 n.3 (1990) (describing historical
origin of § 1985). Operation Rescue argues that the only purpose of the statute is "to protect
black people in America from the Ku Klux Klan." Nightline, supra note 1 (quoting Jay
Sekulow, counsel for Operation Rescue). However, as Professor Tribe notes, § 1985(3), on its
face, is a very broad statute; moreover, in at least two dozen cases, federal judges have applied
the statute in an effort to secure women the opportunity to exercise their rights free from
physical harassment. Id.; see Ken Gormley, Private Conspiracies and the Constitution: A
Modern Vision of 42 U.S.C. Section 1985(3), 64 Tax L. Ray. 527, 530-46 (1985) (outlining
early history of statute and noting decade of disuse). In order to prevail under section 1985(3),
a plaintiff must prove the following:
[T]hat the defendants did (1) "conspire or go in disguise on the highway or on the
premises of another" (2) "for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly,
any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws .
[..."
[T]hen
... that one or more of the conspirators (3) did, or caused to be done, "any act
in furtherance of the object of [the] conspiracy," whereby another was (4a) "injured
in his person or property" or (4b) "deprived of having and exercising any right or
privilege of a citizen of the United States."
Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102-03 (1971); see also NOW v. Terry, 886 F.2d 1339,
1358 (2d Cir. 1989) (describing evidentiary findings required under § 1985(3) and citing Griffin),
cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2206 (1990).
31. Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651, 660-61 (1951).
32. 403 U.S. 88 (1971).
33. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 101 (1971). In Griffin, black petitioners alleged,
among other claims, that the white respondents had conspired to deprive them of their right
to travel by assaulting them on a highway, motivated by a mistaken belief that one of the
petitioners was a civil rights advocate. Id. at 90, 92. The district court, relying on Collins,
had dismissed the petitioners' complaint because it failed to allege the essential state action
element. Id. at 92. Although the Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower court's dismissal of the suit,
the opinion expressed reservations about the Supreme Court precedent established in Collins.
Id. at 92-93. Contrary to both the lower court decisions and Collins, the Griffin Court
.determined that Congress was within its power to protect the right to interstate travel under
§ 1985(3) even absent evidence of state action. Id. at 106. Upon reversal, the Supreme Court
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statute.3 4 In upholding the application of the statute to private conspiracies,
the Court identified both the Thirteenth Amendment 35 and the constitutional
right to interstate travel3 6 as sources of legislative power giving Congress
the ability to reach private conspiracies by means of a federal remedial
statute. 37 According to Griffin, Congress' creation of a statutory cause of
action designed to remedy victims of conspiratorial, racially discriminatory
private action was well within its power under the Thirteenth Amendment.3"
The Court also determined that Congress was within its power to protect
the constitutional right to interstate travel due to a previous Supreme Court
opinion that insulated the right to travel from both governmental and
private interference.3 9
Because Griffin left open the possibility of applying section 1985(3) to
conspiracies centered upon class-based discrimination other than race, 40 a
number of plaintiffs desiring federal relief have argued that the statute
applies to cases involving abortion clinic blockades because such activities
violate either the right to travel, the right to privacy, or both. 41 However,

remanded the case for fact-finding purposes in order to determine whether the petitioners were
travelling or at least were intending to travel interstate and whether the respondents intended
to discriminatorily impair their right to travel by means of a conspiracy. Id. at 106-07.
34. Id. at 96.
35. Id. at 105. The Court recognized that § 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment provides
Congress with the power to reach private conduct by means of legislation. Id. The Thirteenth
Amendment provides in full:
SECTION 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for
crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United
States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.
SECTION 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate
legislation.
U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIII,

§§

1-2.

36. Griffin, 403 U.S. at 105. In Griffin, the Court first explained that because the right
to interstate travel does not necessarily rest upon the Fourteenth Amendment, violation of the
right is actionable against both private and governmental infringement. Id. The Court then
reasoned that as an explicitly recognized right of national citizenship, Congress had the power
to protect the right to interstate travel legislatively by means of the rights and privileges
language of § 1985(3). Id. at 106.
37. Id. at 104-05.
38. Id. at 105.
39. Id.; see Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629-31 (1969) (recognizing foundation
and describing sacredness of right to interstate travel); id. at 642-44 (Stewart, J., concurring
opinion) (noting that right to interstate travel is actionable against private infringement) (citing
United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 760 n.17 (1966)). In Guest, the Court noted the firm
establishment and repeated recognition of the right to travel as a basic right under the
Constitution, despite the fact that the Constitution makes no explicit reference to it. Guest,
383 U.S. at 757-58. The Guest Court speculated that the lack of specific language within the
Constitution mentioning the right to travel was an indication of the right's elementary nature.
Id. at 758.
40. See Griffin, 403 U.S. at 102, 102 n.9 (leaving open question of whether conspiracies
based upon biases other than race satisfy class requirement under § 985(3)).
41. See Volunteer Medical Clinic, Inc. v. Operation Rescue, 948 F.2d 218, 226-27 (6th
Cir. 1991) (reviewing § 1985(3) claim that abortion clinic blockade violated right to travel and
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applying section 1985(3) to abortion clinic blockade cases has created much
controversy. 42 In fact, on October 6, 1991, the Supreme Court heard oral
arguments in NOW v. OperationRescue, 43 a Fourth Circuit case addressing
a number of issues relating to the appropriateness of the statute's application
in the context of abortion clinic blockades."
NOW involved a clash between the National Organization for Women
(NOW), an organization dedicated to the preservation of the constitutional
right to have an abortion, 45 and Operation Rescue, an organization whose
main goals include both the prevention and eventual illegalization of abortions." By blockading abortion facilities' entrances and exits, Operation
Rescue essentially prevents abortions by shutting down clinics. 47 In anticipation of Operation Rescue's demonstrations, NOW successfully obtained
a temporary restraining order from the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia in order to protect Northern Virginia from
abortion clinic blockades scheduled for November 1989.48 Subsequently,
NOW applied for a preliminary injunction, and the district court consolidated the hearing on the application and the trial on the merits into one
49
proceeding.

Together with various abortion clinics, NOW alleged that Operation
Rescue and its supporters engaged in conspiratorial activities designed to
infringe upon the right to have an abortion and the right to interstate

right to privacy); NOW v. Operation Rescue, 914 F.2d 582, 586 (4th Cir. 1990) (reviewing
right to travel claim and refusing to address right to privacy claim under § 1985(3)), cert.
granted sub nom. Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 111 S. Ct. 1070 (1991); NOW
v. Terry, 886 F.2d 1339, 1360-61 (2d Cir. 1989) (same), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2206 (1990).
42. See LAURENCE H. TRiBE, AmERicAN CoNsTrrTioNAL LAw § 5-13, at 333 (2d ed.
1988) (recognizing inherent problems associated with reconciling ambiguous century-old legislative history with contemporary conceptions of individual rights).
43. 914 F.2d 582 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. granted sub nom. Bray v. Alexandria Women's
Health Clinic, 111 S.Ct. 1070 (1991).
44. NOW v. Operation Rescue, 914 F.2d 582 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. granted sub nom.
Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 111 S. Ct. 1070 (1991). The pertinent questions
presented were:
(1) Do "women seeking abortions" constitute [a] valid class for purposes of "class
animus" requirement of 42 U.S.C. 1985(3)? (2) Is opposition to abortion per se
discrimination against women for purposes of "class animus" requirement of 42
U.S.C. 1985(3)? (3) Do purely private actors who hinder access to abortion facilit[ies]
violate federal constitutional right to interstate travel merely because some patrons
of [seeking services at the] facility come from out of state? (4) Are respondents'
claims under 42 U.S.C. 1985(3) so insubstantial as to deprive federal courts of
subject matter jurisdiction?
U.S.L.W. Daily Ed., July 5, 1991.
45. NOW, 914 F.2d at 584.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. Although Operation Rescue did not demonstrate in Northern Virginia during the
month of November, clinics in Maryland and the District of Columbia did shut down because
of the organization's activities in those areas. Id.
49. Id.
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travel. 50 NOW claimed that Operation Rescue had violated the constitutional

right to interstate travel because some of the patients who were unable to
gain access to the abortion clinics were from out of state.'

After a two-

day proceeding, in which Operation Rescue chose not to testify, the court
granted a permanent injunction enjoining Operation Rescue and six named
individuals from blockading patients' access to abortion clinics, pursuant to
section 1985(3) and the constitutional right to interstate travel.2 Subsequently, Operation Rescue appealed the district court's decision while NOW
cross-appealed, specifically questioning the court's refusal to extend the

scope of the injunctive relief." The Fourth Circuit, however, rejected both
appeals and upheld the district court's decision in full.5 4 Therefore, in light
of the history and development of section 1985(3), the statute should apply
in the abortion clinic blockade context.
III.

Ti

CLAss-BASED ANIMUS REQUIREMENT OF SECTION

1985(3)

The language of section 1985(3) encompasses conspiratorial activities
that effectively prevent any person or protected class of persons from
exercising rights guaranteed under the law regardless of the conspirators'

alleged motivation for the deprivation. 55 Therefore, the essential showing
under the plain meaning of section 1985(3) is not the existence of a
conspiracy to discriminate, but rather the existence of a conspiracy to
deprive. 6 However, in Griffin, upon reviewing the statute's legislative

50. See NOW v. Operation Rescue, 726 F. Supp. 1483, 1492-94 (E.D. Va. 1989)
(addressing plaintiffs' right to travel and right to privacy claims under § 1985(3)), aff'd, 914
F.2d 582 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. granted sub nom. Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic,
III S. Ct. 1070 (1991).
51. Id. at 1493.
52. Id.
53. NOW v. Operation Rescue, 914 F.2d 582, 584 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. granted sub
nom. Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 111 S. Ct. 1070 (1991).
54. Id.
55. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1988). See supra note 29 (citing statutory language of § 1985(3)).
Examining the protected class of native American Indians provides a useful analogy to the
abortion clinic blockade context. The federal government by means of the Indian Reorganization
Act guarantees native American Indians the right to own land on reservations if they so desire.
See 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-79 (1988) (detailing protection of Indians and conservation of resources).
However, the federal government does not guarantee all persons the right to live on a
reservation. Id. If a group of private citizens made up of native American Indians, as well as
people of other descents, wished to promote assimilation and conspired to shut down all
reservations, could the group successfully argue that its actions were not discriminatory because
it was denying all people access to reservations, regardless of their national origin? To answer
the question affirmatively would mean that conspirators could avoid the label of discrimination
simply by including within their target group, people that have no federally protected rights
at stake and consequently do not suffer in a legal sense from the conspirators' deprivation of
the protected class's rights or at least do not suffer in the same legal sense that the protected
class suffers.
56. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1988); see supra note 29 (setting forth statutory language of
§ 1985(3), which includes no mention of motivation element).
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history, the Court pointed out that although Congress did intend to cover
private conspiracies under section 1985(3), it did not intend for the statute
57
to encompass all conspiratorial interferences with the rights of others.
Therefore, both to avoid the constitutional problems inherent in construing
section 1985(3) as a general federal tort law and to interpret the statute
consistently with its congressional purpose, the Court grafted a requirement
of invidious discrimination motivation onto the section 1985(3) cause of
action.5" As a result, section 1985(3) requires a finding that discrimination
motivated the conspirators to purposely deprive a particular class of people
the enjoyment of rights guaranteed to all under the law. 9
Under Griffin, women seeking abortions must satisfy two elements to
qualify as a viable class under section 1985(3). 60 The first element is whether
section 1985(3) includes gender discrimination within its purview; the second
element is whether blocking access to abortion clinics constitutes gender
discrimination. 61 The federal district court in NOW reasoned that section
1985(3) does protect persons from gender-based discrimination because a
person's sex has certain distinct and immutable characteristics comparable
to those of race and national origin. 62 Consequently, the court determined
that women seeking abortions constitute a valid subset of gender-based
animus under the statute's protected class requirements.63 After finding that
Operation Rescue's blockade activities violated the substantive provisions
of section 1985(3), the court issued permanent injunctive relief in favor of
NOW.6 Although the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
upheld the district court's determinations that evidence of gender-based
discrimination satisfies the class-based animus requirement of section 1985(3),
and that NOW's members and abortion clinic patients constituted a valid
subset of the gender-based class,65 not all jurisdictions have drawn the same

57. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 101 (1971).
58. Id. at 102. The current Court recognizes that the invidiously discriminatory motivation
element of § 1985(3) is a creature of the Griffin Court. 60 U.S.L.W. 3331, 3332 (U.S. Nov.
5, 1991). As Justice Scalia in NOW reminded counsel for Operation Rescue during oral
arguments, the statutory language of § 1985(3) has no class-based animus requirement as such
and that the Court had simply made it up. Id.
59. Griffin, 403 U.S. at 102.
60. See Beth E. Hansen, Note, "Invidiously DiscriminatoryAnimus"--A Class Based
on Gender and Gestation Under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3): Lewis v. Pearson Found., Inc., 24
CREiGHToN L. REv. 1097, 1106-07 (1991) (describing class-based animus requirement of
§ 1985(3) as developed under Griffin).
61. See Volunteer Medical Clinic, Inc. v. Operation Rescue, 948 F.2d 218, 223-25 (6th
Cir. 1991) (detailing class-based animus requirement of § 1985(3) and finding that statute
encompasses women seeking relief against abortion clinic blockades).
62. NOW v. Operation Rescue, 726 F. Supp. 1483, 1492 (E.D. Va. 1989), aff'd, 914
F.2d 582 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. granted sub nom. Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic,
111 S. Ct. 1070 (1991).
63. Id.
64. Id.at 1493.
65. NOW v. Operation Rescue, 914 F.2d 582, 585 (4th Cir. 1990), ceit. granted sub
nom. Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 111 S.Ct. 1070 (1991). See NOW v. Terry,

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49:237

conclusion.6 The Fourth Circuit's opinion, however, is consistent with the
majority of jurisdictions addressing the issue of whether women constitute
a valid class under section 1985(3).67
Even if one follows the majority view that section 1985(3) does provide
relief against gender discrimination," a second potential stumbling block
exists as to whether blockading abortion clinics constitutes gender discrimination. It is difficult to address whether shutting down abortion clinics
constitutes discrimination against women because the right to have an
abortion is a right associated solely with females. 69 Therefore, because only
a woman can make the abortion choice, it is impossible to argue that
Operation Rescue allows men to have the choice while denying the right to

886 F.2d 1339, 1358-59 (2d Cir. 1989) (finding that women seeking abortions constitute
protected class under § 1985(3)), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2206 (1990). Among other observations,
the Second Circuit in Terry noted the broad statutory language used in § 1985(3) and concluded
that women were not excluded from the statute's reach. Id. at 1358. The Second Circuit also
found that the very nature of § 1985(3)'s language ties it to evolving notions of equality and
citizenship, and that the legislative history of the statute favors a broad construction of its
language as a law applicable not just to blacks but to women as well. Id. at 1359.
66. See Lewis v. Pearson Found., Inc., 908 F.2d 318, 324-25 (8th Cir. 1990) (finding
originally that § 1985(3) protects women seeking termination of pregnancies but vacating
judgment upon rehearing en banc), vacated, 917 F.2d 1077, petitionfor cert. filed, 59 U.S.L.W.
3726 (U.S. Apr. 23, 1991) (No. 90-1575); Mississippi Women's Medical Clinic v. McMillan,
866 F.2d 788, 793-94 (5th Cir. 1989) (concluding that class defined as women of childbearing
age seeking medical attention was too under-inclusive to warrant protection under § 1985(3));
Roe v. Abortion Abolition Soc'y, 811 F.2d 931, 934-37 (5th Cir.) (determining that patients,
doctors, abortion clinics and staff defining themselves as people in disagreement with defendant's view on abortion did not constitute valid protected class under § 1985(3) because class
was over-inclusive), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987). See also National Abortion Fed. v.
Operation Rescue, 721 F. Supp. 1168, 1170 (C.D. Cal. 1989) (holding that language of
§ 1985(3) did not encompass women seeking abortions).
67. See Volunteer Medical Clinic, Inc. v. Operation Rescue, 948 F.2d 218, 224-25 (6th
Cir. 1991) (finding that women constitute cognizable class under § 1985(3)); NOW v. Terry,
886 F.2d 1339, 1355-59 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding that women qualify as valid protected class
under § 1985(3)), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2206 (1990); Volk v. Coler, 845 F.2d 1422, 1434
(7th Cir. 1988) (concluding that § 1985(3) encompasses conspiratorial discrimination based
upon sex); Stathos v. Bowden, 728 F.2d 15, 20-21 (1st Cir. 1984) (applying § 1985(3) to award
damages in sexual discrimination case); Life Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Reichardt, 591 F.2d 499,
505 (9th Cir. 1979) (finding that legislative history of § 1985(3) supports extending application
of statute to women); Novotny v. Great Am. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 584 F.2d 1235, 124344 (3d Cir. 1978) (holding that conspiratorial discrimination based upon sex is actionable under
§ 1985(3)), vacated on other grounds, 442 U.S. 366 (1979).
68. But see 60 U.S.L.W. 3331, 3332 (U.S. Nov. 5, 1991) (acknowledging fact that
Supreme Court has yet to determine whether § 1985(3) protects women). Realizing that the
Supreme Court has yet to decide whether women are a cognizable class under the statute,
counsel for NOW asserted that because women are a class identified by immutable characteristics, they deserve § 1985(3) protection. Id. Counsel also suggested that the Court's decision
in Novotny indirectly supports the conclusion that § 1985(3) encompasses gender-based conspiracies within its purview. Id.
69. See Volunteer Medical Clinic, Inc. v. Operation Rescue, 948 F.2d 218, 225 (6th Cir.
1991) (recognizing that preventing women from gaining access to abortion clinics encroaches
upon rights of all women).
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women. However, Operation Rescue, by shutting down abortion clinics,
does discriminate against women by preventing them from exercising their
constitutionally protected privacy rights, which the organization would permit others to exercise.70 For example, Operation Rescue does not attempt
to interfere with a male's right to privacy, because such interference would
not serve the organization's purpose-to prevent abortions. 71 Likewise, the
group does not interfere with men travelling from out of state to obtain
contraception for the same reason-to do so would serve no organizational
purpose.72 In essence, Operation Rescue discriminates against women because
it views discriminatory activities as essential to fulfillment of the organiza7
tion's overall goal of preventing abortions. 1
Because the right to have an abortion is exclusively a woman's right,
separating the right from the protected class is difficult. Furthermore,
because an abortion clinic blockade is an example of an infringement upon
a right integrally related to the protected class associated with it, such a
situation should call for the courts to exercise an even greater level of
judicial scrutiny than if the right infringed upon were a right guaranteed to
all persons regardless of status as a protected class. In other words,
Operation Rescue's tactical infringement upon the constitutional right to
choose is especially suspect because the right to have an abortion is a right
biologically restricted to women and because women are a protected class
under equal protection analysis.7 4

70. But see infra notes 83-84 and accompanying text (noting that in terms of abortion
clinic blockades, Operation Rescue denies both women and men access to clinics).
71. See Donahue, supra note 1, at 4-5 (noting that interference with use of condoms
does not serve Operation Rescue's ultimate agenda).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. But cf. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 497 (1974) (holding that California's
disability insurance program which denied benefits to pregnant women was constitutional),
overruled by statute as stated in Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462
U.S. 669 (1983). In Geduldig, the Court held that excluding pregnant women from a state
disability insurance program was not violative of the Fourteenth Amendment. 417 U.S. at
497. Pregnant persons and nonpregnant persons were the two classes of people implicated in
the case. Id. at 489-90. Although the first class consisted exclusively of women, the second
group did not; consequently the Court ruled that because both sexes benefitted from the
insurance proceeds, the state program was not discriminatory. Id. at 494. Geduldig, however
is distinguishable from the abortion clinic blockade cases for two reasons. First, the abortion
clinic blockade cases involve the deprivation of a constitutionally protected right. There is no
constitutional right to receive disability payments. Moreover, there is no guarantee that all
disabled persons, pregnant or otherwise, will receive benefits as other plan qualifications may
exist. In other words, both classes defined in Geduldig were a pool of potential insurance
recipients while abortion clinic blockades involve a class of persons whose constitutional rights
have vested. Second, because abortion clinic blockades deprive women alone of a right that
at least some wish to exercise, it is difficult to characterize the deprivation as affecting both
sexes equally. Therefore, unlike the state disability program, Operation Rescue's tactics are
discriminatory against women.
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Although the Fourth Circuit in NOW, following the Second Circuit's
lead in NOW v. Terry,7 found that Operation Rescue's activities were
discriminatorily motivated,7 6 such a position is not without criticism." For
example, abortion protesters contend that abortion clinic blockades cannot
constitute gender discrimination because many people, and more specifically,
many women, support the antiabortion movement.78 Jay Sekulow, counsel
for Operation Rescue, contends that the abortion protest situation is quite
unlike instances of racial discrimination because no black person would ever
support acts of racial bigotry,7 9 while many women, like Jayne Bray, one
of the petitioners in NOW, are fighting abortion on a daily basis and
support the Operation Rescue movement wholeheartedly. 0 However, the
point that not all women support the right to have an abortion does not
alter the fact that blocking access to clinics denies women as a protected
class the opportunity to exercise their constitutionally protected right s' to
82
choose whether or not to have an abortion.
Another criticism noted during oral arguments before the Supreme Court
in NOW is that the focus of the abortion protesters' hostility or animus is
on the "activity" of abortion, not on the women who are seeking abortions.83 Accordingly, gender does not factor into the protesters' minds when

75. 886 F.2d 1339 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2206 (1990).
76. NOW v. Operation Rescue, 914 F.2d 582, 585 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. granted sub
nom. Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 111 S. Ct. 1070 (1991).
77. See infra notes 78-80, 83-84 and accompanying text (arguing that Operation Rescue's
activities are not discriminatory against women).
78. See Hall, supra note 4 (reporting that many women oppose abortion).
79. Operation Rescue's distinction between racial and gender discrimination fails even if
a black person supports acts of conspiratorial racial bigotry because the acts are still constitutionally invalid. In other words, the constitutionality of an act does not turn upon the race
or sex of those who are in support of it.
80. See Hall, supra note 4 (recognizing Bray's association and sympathy with antiabortion
movement). Jayne Bray's alliance with Operation Rescue is apparent as she was one of the
petitioners in NOW v. Operation Rescue. NOW v. Operation Rescue, 914 F.2d 582 (4th Cir.
1990), cert. granted sub nom. Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 111 S. Ct. 1070
(1991). Her husband, Michael Bray, spent four years in jail because of his association with
the 1985 Washington area abortion clinic bombings. Hall, supra note 4.
81. See infra note 160 (summarizing current cases challenging constitutional right to
abortion).
82. See Hall, supra note -4 (arguing that protected class is that of women in general).
The protection of constitutional rights should not turn upon the number or gender of the
people actively supporting the rights. For instance, not all women take advantage of their
right to vote, but that does not make the right to vote any less fundamental to women as a
class nor should that enable private citizens to conspire to prevent any woman from exercising
her right to vote.
83. 60 U.S.L.W. 3331, 3331 (U.S. Nov. 5, 1991) In addition to arguing that Operation
Rescue's class-based animus is directed toward the activity of abortion and not against women
as a class, the organization contends that its activities are not discriminatory because of its
worthy intentions behind every abortion clinic blockade. See NOW v. Terry, 886 F.2d 1339,
1360 (2d Cir. 1989) (noting Operation Rescue's denial of ill-will towards women and rejecting
antiabortion group's "this is for your own good" argument), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2206
(1990).
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blockading access to abortion clinics because rescue demonstrations deny
entrance to all persons, regardless of their sex. The counter argument as
articulated by counsel for the clinics is that by targeting abortion, protesters
are in essence targeting women, because the right to have an abortion is
solely a woman's right.8 5 Furthermore, even if Operation Rescue members
do not target women specifically during their rescue demonstrations, the
fact remains that the organization's tactics deny women the opportunity to
exercise their rights.86 Even though Operation Rescue's target group includes
other individuals besides women seeking abortions, this should not diminish
the validity of a section 1985(3) claim.Y As Justice O'Connor noted, such
strange reasoning then would apply equally to a mob conspiring to prevent
black children and white children from entering an integrated school."8
In fact, Justice O'Connor's example suggests a two-fold parallel to
Operation Rescue's argument: first, the analogy of the make-up of the
target groups and second, the "activity" of integration as compared to the
"activity" of abortion. 9 Under Operation Rescue's construction of section
1985(3), private conspirators whose alleged animus is not against black
persons but rather against the activity of integration could, under federal
law, deprive black people from gaining access to public school systemsP °
Similar to Operation Rescue's contention that women are not the only target
of its abortion blockades, an anti-integration group could argue that black
children were not the only target of integration blockades because white
children were denied access to the school as well. In upholding such a
construction, all private conspirators could escape the purview of section
1985(3) simply by alleging that their animus is not class-based but rather
activity-based. Permitting such an easily accessible escape hatch would
destroy the efficacy of section 1985(3).91 Therefore, denying women access
to abortion clinics should satisfy the class-based requirement of section
1985(3).
84. See Marcus, supra note 22 (noting lack of hostility towards women, as motivation
behind abortion clinic blockades).
85. See id. (disputing argument that Operation Rescue does not target women during
protests).
86. See infra notes 88-91 and accompanying text (assessing Operation Rescue's argument
that women are not specifically targeted during abortion clinic blockades).
87. See id. (refuting Operation Rescue's contention that targeting mixed group means

no discrimination). In addition to targeting women seeking abortions, Operation Rescue
prevents abortion clinic staff from gaining entrance to facilities. NOW v. Operation Rescue,
726 F. Supp. 1483, 1488 (E.D. Va. 1989), aff'd, 914 F.2d 582 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. granted
sub nom. Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 111 S. Ct. 1070 (1991).

88. See Marcus, supra note 22 (questioning Operation Rescue's reasoning during oral
arguments in NOW v. Operation Rescue as applied to preventing black and white children
from attending integrated school).
89. 60 U.S.L.W. 3331, 3332 (U.S. Nov. 5, 1991) (drawing from Justice O'Connor's

school house analogy).
90. See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text (noting Operation Rescue's argument

that its animus is directed towards activity of abortion and not towards women).
91. See Hall, supra note 4 (noting strangeness of Operation Rescue's argument that its

animus is towards activity of abortion).
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CoNsTITUTONAL GUARANTEEs UNDER SECTION 1985(3)

At least two constitutional guarantees-the right to interstate travel and

the right to privacy-provide a basis for relief under section 1985(3) in the
context of abortion clinic blockades. 92 The inherent benefit in arguing that
section 1985(3) protects the right to interstate travel is that such a construction does not require any evidence of state action. 93 As for the constitutionally protected right to privacy, most jurisdictions have indicated, without
actually deciding the issue, 94 that evidence of state action is an essential
prerequisite to even proposing such a claim.95

The district court in NOW v. Operation Rescue refused to determine
whether section 1985(3) provides relief for violations of the constitutional
right to privacy. 96 Instead, the court relied upon the clinic's convenient

location in the Washington, D.C., metropolitan area and the constitutional
right to interstate travel as the vehicle to bring the antiabortion blockades
within the statute's purview. 97 Because the right to interstate travel serves

as an independent basis for relief under section 1985(3), 9s and the right to
an abortion would require evidence of state action to trigger the statute, 99
92. See NOW v. Operation Rescue, 726 F. Supp 1483, 1492-94 (E.D. Va. 1989), affid,914
F.2d 582 (4th Cir. 1990) (analyzing § 1985(3) claims based upon right to travel and right to
privacy), cert. granted sub nom. Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, I11 S. Ct. 1070
(1991).
93. See supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text (noting that right to interstate travel
is actionable against both private and governmental infringement).
94. See NOW v. Terry, 886 F.2d 1339, 1361 (2d Cir. 1989) (finding that right to travel
provided independent constitutional claim rendering decision as to right to privacy claim
unnecessary), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2206 (1990). See also NOW, 726 F. Supp. at 1494.
95. See Terry, 886 F.2d at 1361 (citing district court's determination that protection of

right to privacy guarantee requires demonstration of state involvement). But see Lewis v.
Pearson Found., Inc., 908 F.2d 318, 322 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding initially that privacy claim
based upon Roe v. Wade did not require evidence of state action under § 1985(3)), vacated,
917 F.2d 1077, petition for cert. filed, 59 U.S.L.W. 3726 (U.S. Apr. 23, 1991) (No. 90-1575).
96. NOW, 726 F. Supp. at 1494.
97. Id. at 1493. The district court in NOW v. Operation Rescue relied upon the right
to travel as a basis for granting relief under § 1985(3) because of the evidence that the clinics
in question provided services to patients travelling across state lines. Id.
98. Id. at 1494. See Terry, 886 F.2d at 1361 (deciding not to rule on § 1985(3) right to
privacy claim).
99. NOW, 726 F. Supp. at 1493-94. See Terry, 886 F.2d at 1358 (citing and quoting in
part United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners Local 610 v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 833
(1983)). In NOW v. Terry, the court stated that "[w]hen the asserted constitutional deprivation
is based upon a right guaranteed against government interference-for example, rights secured
by the Fourteenth Amendment-plaintiffs must demonstrate some 'state involvement."' Id.
Therefore, because the cornerstone of the right to privacy is the Fourteenth Amendment,
invoking the protection of § 1985(3) requires a showing of state involvement. See id. at 1361
(noting that right to privacy claim requires showing of state involvement). Although the district
court had determined that there was a sufficient showing of state action, especially given an
agreement between Operation Rescue and the local New York police that officers would not
arrest any demonstrators, the Second Circuit found it unnecessary to rule on the right to
privacy claim given the availability of the right to travel as an independent basis for affirming
the district court's decision to grant relief under § 1985(3). Id.
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the court reasoned that evaluation of a claim based upon the right to
privacy was not essential to its holding. 100
The court based its decision to grant injunctive relief in part on Doe
v. Bolton, 0 1 in which the Supreme Court established that the constitutional
right to travel encompasses the right to travel interstate in order to obtain
an abortion.102 As the district court pointed out in NOW, courts should
avoid constitutional questions where other grounds are available and dispositive of the issues presented. 13 This maxim concerning judicial restraint
provided the NOW court with the necessary support to refuse to pass on
the contention that section 1985(3) protects women from conspiratorial
1 4
activities that infringe upon the fundamental right to have an abortion. 0
In issuing the injunction, the district court refrained from extending the
application of section 1985(3) into both the right to privacy area and the
scope of the relief granted based upon the right to interstate travel for fear
of creating an apparent imbalance in the equitable relief granted warranting

a reversal.105
By basing the injunction upon a conspiracy to violate the right to travel
interstate, the district court in NOW, along with other jurisdictions ruling
the same way,101 has in essence established the groundwork for abortion

100. NOW, 726 F. Supp. at 1494. Given the alternative independent basis for granting
relief pursuant to § 1985(3) using the right to travel and the realization that the right to have
an abortion is in a state of flux, the district court in NOW v. Operation Rescue determined
that it was unnecessary and imprudent to venture into the fundamental right to abortion
thicket. Id.
101. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
102. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 200 (1973). In Doe, the Court found that the residence
requirement in Georgia's abortion law violated the constitution. Id.
103. NOW, 726 F. Supp at 1494 (citing Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948)).
104. Id. The district court's use in NOW of the maxim that courts should avoid constitutional questions where other grounds are dispositive of the issue is questionable, however,
for two reasons. First, because the district court based its decision to issue the injunction
under § 1985(3) upon finding a violation of the right to interstate travel, the court did not
avoid all constitutional issues. In other words, the other grounds that the district court used
to avoid addressing the right to privacy question were themselves constitutional grounds.
Second, the fact that the Supreme Court is reviewing the application of the right to interstate
travel under § 1985(3) in the abortion protest context means that the other grounds relied
upon by the district court are no longer dispositive of the issues at stake in the case.
105. See id. at 1497 (finding NOW's requests for nationwide injunctive relief and for
prohibition of Operation Rescue's intimidation tactics overly broad). The Fourth Circuit in
NOW reviewed the district court's issuance of the permanent injunction according to an abuse
of discretion standard. See NOW v. Operation Rescue, 914 F.2d 582, 585 (4th Cir. 1990)
(citing Prendergast v. New York Telephone Co., 262 U.S. 43, 50-51 (1923)), cert. grantedsub
nom. Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 111 S. Ct. 1070 (1991). As a result, the
entry, scope and duration of the equitable relief granted by the district court in NOW was
subject to the Fourth Circuit's examination. See id. (describing standard of review regarding
injunctive relief). Therefore, the greater the reach of the federal injunction, the greater the
likelihood of an appellate finding of discretionary abuse on the part of the district court. See
id. at 586 (upholding district court's decision not to extend scope of injunction indefinitely).
106. See NOW v. Operation Rescue, 726 F. Supp. 300, 304 (D.D.C. 1989) (basing § 1985(3)
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"zones" or "hubs"-certain geographical areas or cities in which clinics
may continue to operate unhindered."07 More than likely, clinics located in
these abortion "hubs" will have the opportunity to charge significant
premiums for their services, due to the limited number and locations of
available facilities. 08 Abortions could thus become prohibitively expensive
for many women.'09 In other words, if the only basis for section 1985(3)
protection is the constitutional right to travel, then the ability of a given
clinic to draw interstate travellers will determine whether the federal statute
offers the facility any protection. 10 Arguably, such a disparity in treatment,

based solely upon a clinic's ability to draw interstate patients, in itself
creates an equal protection problem, as women accessing clinics in rural or
central areas are without any federal protection under the statute, while
federal relief is available to their female counterparts accessing clinics
situated in highly travelled or state-borderline areas."'
A further complication to basing a section 1985(3) claim upon the right
to interstate travel is determining how large an interstate draw is necessary
to implicate the constitutional guarantee. Although section 1985(3) facially

provides relief to any person or class of persons deprived of a right,
Operation Rescue contends that the organization does not purposely deprive

out-of-state women from gaining access to abortion clinics because the real
purpose of the blockades is to prevent all people from accessing clinics

regardless of their respective state residencies. In other words, Operation
Rescue does not treat women seeking abortion services who come across
2
state lines differently from in-state residents seeking the same services."
However, an additional way to implicate the right to travel interstate is
relief upon right to travel); Cousins v. Terry, 721 F. Supp. 426, 429-30 (N.D.N.Y. 1989)
(same); Roe v. Operation Rescue, 710 F. Supp. 577, 581-82 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (same); NOW v.
Terry, 704 F. Supp. 1247, 1260 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (same), aff'd, 886 F.2d 1339 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 110 S. Ct. 2206 (1990).
107. See Henn & Del Monaco, supra note 18, at 265 (recognizing limitations of § 1985(3)
claim based upon right to travel because it presents problems for clinics located far away from
state borders).
108. See Maraniss, supra note 7 (recognizing potential impact of Operation Rescue's
abortion clinic blockades). According to the National Abortion Rights Action League, since
1985, the availability of abortion providers has decreased in 33 states. Id. At least one clinic
that no longer provides abortion services attributes its decision to threats by Operation Rescue.
Id.
109. See NOW, 726 F. Supp. at 1489 n.3 (recognizing that some clinics offer services to
indigent patients free of charge).
110. See Volunteer Medical Clinic, Inc. v. Operation Rescue 948 F.2d 218, 226 (6th Cir.
1991) (upholding dismissal of § 1985(3) claim based upon right of interstate travel because
clinic offered no evidence of patients travelling from outside of state in order to obtain clinic
services).
111. Compare id. (upholding district court's dismissal of § 1985(3) claim based upon right
to interstate travel due to clinic's lack of out-of-state patients) with NOW v. Operation Rescue,
914 F.2d 582, 585 (4th Cir. 1990) (affirming district court's finding of § 1985(3) claim based
upon right to interstate travel due to sufficient evidence of clinic's interstate clientele), cert.
granted sub nom. Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 111 S. Ct. 1070 (1991).
112. 60 U.S.L.W. 3331, 3332 (U.S. Nov. 5, 1991).
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actual interference with the right.1 13 If one woman travelling across state
lines to seek an abortion is prevented from entering an abortion clinic by
means of a private conspiracy, and her status as a solitary interstate traveller
affects the outcome under section 1985(3), then clinics not willing to run
the risk of a blockade will need to market themselves to out-of-state
patients.' 4 Two conceivable means for satisfying the interstate draw requirement are through (1) geographical location," 5 or (2) the availability of
specialized medical services at the clinic." 6 Abortion clinics lacking these
attributes and therefore unable to draw interstate travellers will tend to shut
down in order to avoid Operation Rescue blockades, while new clinics
opening up will tend either to cluster around convenient "zones" or to
provide specialized medical services in an effort to attract interstate patients." 7 Therefore, the NOW court's decision to grant injunctive relief
based solely upon the right to interstate travel has inherent weaknesses and
inappropriate consequences.
In reviewing the district court's decision to grant an injunction, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit noted with approval
the geographical limitation of the injunctive relief to the specific site in
question, Northern Virginia." 8 Furthermore, the appellate court emphasized
that neither court had addressed the controversial question of whether
section 1985(3) provides relief against conspiracies designed to infringe upon
a woman's right to privacy. 1 9 The Fourth Circuit upheld the trial court's
injunction, finding no abuse of discretion in the entry, scope, or duration
20
of the equitable relief.'
113. Id.
114. See U.S.L.W. Daily Ed., July 5, 1991 (questioning whether purely private actors

blocking access to abortion facility violates federal constitutional right to interstate travel
merely because some patrons of facility come from out of state). Consider replacing the
scenario of one woman travelling from out-of-state who is unable to obtain abortion services
due to Operation Rescue's abortion clinic blockade activities with a single black person who

is a victim of a conspiracy designed to keep him from gaining entrance to a restaurant after
travelling interstate. Seemingly, the lack of group status would not make the civil rights

violation under § 1985(3) any less reprehensible or actionable.
115. See NOW v. Operation Rescue, 726 F. Supp 1483, 1493 (E.D. Va. 1989) (citing

testimony indicating that clinic offered services to patients who travelled from out of state),
aff'd, 914 F.2d 582 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. granted sub nom. Bray v. Alexandria Women's
Health Clinic, 111 S. Ct. 1070 (1991). Two situations in which the geographical location of a
clinic can implicate the constitutional right to travel are when the clinic is situated close to an
interstate border or when the clinic is located in a conveniently accessible area.
116. See U.S. Backs Protesters,supra note 13 (noting scarcity of clinics performing late

term abortions). The staff at Women's Health Care Services, one of the abortion clinics
involved in the Wichita controversy, performs third trimester abortions. Id. Because the clinic

is one of the few facilities in the nation providing such a service, women do travel to Wichita
from out of state seeking late term terminations of pregnancies. Id.

117. See supra notes 107-16 and accompanying text (assessing right to travel as basis for
relief under § 1985(3)).
118. NOW v. Operation Rescue, 914 F.2d 582, 586 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. granted sub
nom. Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, I11 S. Ct. 1070 (1991).
119. Id.
120. Id. at 585-86.
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An understandable level of judicial trepidation exists in addressing the
controversial issue of whether section 1985(3) protects the right to have an
abortion from private conspiracies.' 2 ' However, the judiciary creates a gap
in legal protection by failing to address situations involving noninterstate
facilities. The implicit message is that women seeking abortions in clinics
that serve only one state will receive no federal protection under section
1985(3) simply because the facilities they visit lack interstate clientele.'2
Because the majority of federal courts continue to avoid the real underlying
right at stake in the antiabortion blockades,'2 private conspiracies will force
many women seeking abortions to travel to protected abortion clinics in
order to avoid demonstrations designed to infringe upon their constitutional
freedom of choice.' 24 Therefore, as long as the right to have an abortion
remains constitutionally protected, federal courts have a duty to protect the
right from private conspiratorial infringement under section 1985(3).
V.

STATE ACTION REQUREMENT UNDER SECTION 1985(3)

Given that section 1985(3) does encompass the protection of the right
to privacy, the majority of cases provide that evidence of private interference
alone is not sufficient to make out a prima facie case under section 1985(3)
because deprivation of the right to privacy, unlike deprivation of the right
to interstate travel, requires evidence of state involvement. ' 2 In fact, after

121. Compare NOW v. Operation Rescue, 726 F. Supp. 1483, 1493-94 (E.D. Va. 1989)
(failing to address right to privacy "thicket" and potential application of right under § 1985(3)),
aff'd, 914 F.2d 582 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. granted sub nom. Bray v. Alexandria Women's
Health Clinic, 111 S. Ct. 1070 (1991) with Volunteer Medical Clinic, Inc. v. Operation Rescue,
948 F.2d 218, 227-28 (6th Cir. 1991) (analyzing tight to privacy claim under § 1985(3) and
finding insufficient evidence of state action to warrant relief under statute). In Volunteer
Medical Clinic, the district court properly dismissed the § 1985(3) claim based upon the tight
to travel, and, therefore, neither the district court nor the appellate court had the opportunity
to avoid addressing the right to privacy argument by relying upon the alternative constitutional
grounds maxim. Id. at 226.
122. See supra notes 107-16 and accompanying text (addressing inherent weaknesses of
§ 1985(3) claim based upon constitutional right to interstate travel).
123. But see Volunteer Medical Clinic, 948 F.2d at 227-28 (evaluating § 1985(3) claim
based upon deprivation of right to privacy and reversing district court's decision to grant
injunctive relief). In Volunteer Medical Clinic, although the appellate court affirmed the district
court's determination that women were a cognizable class under § 1985(3), the Sixth Circuit
reversed the district court's finding of sufficient state action and held that the alleged state
involvement in the case did not meet the level required under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
at 225, 228.
124. See supra notes 107-16 and accompanying text (speculating on impact of basing
federal protection under § 1985(3) upon right to interstate travel). Federal protection under §
1985(3) based solely upon the right to interstate travel might force women to go as far as the
nearest "hub" clinic in order to have an abortion, resulting in significant expenditures that
typically accompany travelling to such locations. For some women, such additional travelling
costs would make having an abortion prohibitively expensive, leaving them without any realistic
opportunity to exercise their constitutionally protected right to choose.
125. See supra note 99 and accompanying text (analyzing § 1985(3) claim based upon
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determining that section 1985(3) did encompass a right to privacy, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in Volunteer Medical
Clinic, Inc. v. Operation Rescuel 26 dismissed the section 1985(3) lawsuit
because the claim lacked the requisite basis of state action.12 7 The rationale
behind the Sixth Circuit's decision stems from the Supreme Court's interpretation in United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners Local 610 v.
Scott-8 of section 1985(3) as solely a remedial statute that falls to create
any substantive federal rights in and of itself.- 9 In other words, any section
1985(3) claim turns upon the violation of the underlying right associated
with the lawsuit. 30 Because the right to privacy, the cornerstone of which
is the Fourteenth Amendment, is by definition a right actionable only
against state interference, a valid section 1985(3) claim based upon such a
13
violation requires evidence of state action.'
Therefore, following the Sixth Circuit's approach in Volunteer Medical
Clinic, determining what level or amount of state action or inaction constitutes sufficient state involvement to trigger the remedial provisions of the
statute is a critical issue to any section 1985(3) claim involving an alleged
deprivation of the right to privacy.' In Scott, the Supreme Court held that
a section 1985(3) claim involving a deprivation of a Fourteenth Amendment
right requires either a showing of state involvement in the conspiracy or a
showing that the conspiracy's goal is to influence state activity. 3 In Lugar
v. Edmondson Oil Co.,134 the Court defined the state action requirement of
the Fourteenth Amendment as conduct that is fairly attributable to the
state. 3 Examining abortion clinic blockade cases in particular, there is some

right to privacy). But cf. Lewis v. Pearson Found., Inc., 908 F.2d 318, 320-22 (8th Cir. 1990)
(finding originally that § 1985(3) claim based upon right to privacy need not include evidence
of state action), vacated, 917 F.2d 1077, petition for cert. filed, 59 U.S.L.W. 3726 (U.S. Apr.
23, 1991) (No. 90-1575). In a panel decision, the Lewis court determined that § 1985(3)
encompassed private conspiracies that implicated the principles of Roe v. Wade, and as a
result, a showing of state involvement was unnecessary. Id. However, upon rehearing the case
en bane, the Eighth Circuit vacated the panel opinion and affirmed the district court's dismissal
of the complaint. Lewis, 917 F.2d at 1077.
126. 948 F.2d 218 (6th Cir. 1991).
127. Volunteer Medical Clinic, Inc. v. Operation Rescue, 948 F.2d 218, 228 (6th Cir.
1991).
128. 463 U.S. 825 (1983).
129. United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners Local 610 v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 830
(1983); see also Great Am. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366, 372 (1979)
(emphasizing remedial nature of § 1985(3)).
130. Scott, 463 U.S. at 830.
131. Id.
132. Volunteer Medical Clinic, Inc. v. Operation Rescue, 948 F.2d 218, 225 (6th Cir.
1991).
133. Scott, 463 U.S. at 830.
134. 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
135. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982). The test developed in Lugar
as to whether conduct is fairly attributable to the state as required under the Fourteenth
Amendment has two parts. Id. First is whether some right or privilege created by a state or
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authority recognizing that. Operation Rescue's failure to notify law enforcement officials about abortion clinic blockades constitutes the necessary state
action element under section 1985(3).136 Likewise, an agreement that the
police will not arrest any antiabortion
demonstrators arguably is sufficient
37
evidence of state involvement.

Throughout the abortion clinic blockades in Wichita, Operation Rescue
members received encouraging state and local support. 31 In fact, one of

the reasons Randall Terry chose Wichita as the setting for the "Summer of
Mercy" was because of its conservative, religious, and apparently sympathetic residents. 39 Not only did the protesters receive free food and drinks

from local restaurants, but also Kansas Governor Joan Finney appeared
during one of their rallies and spoke to the group, demonstrating her
sympathy and alliance with the movement 40 Although the Governor asked

the demonstrators to refrain from breaking the law, she nevertheless informed Operation Rescue members that she supported their cause, thus

bringing into question the effectiveness of her request for members not to
4

break any laws.' '
Furthermore, both the Mayor of Wichita and the local United States
attorney praised Operation Rescue for its noble cause. 42 In fact, during the
initial days of the "Summer of Mercy," the Mayor, a noted antiabortionist,
along with Wichita's City Manager, instructed the Chief of Police and
fellow officers first to give abortion protesters the opportunity to block
43
clinic gates and then to arrest the demonstrators using minimum force.

a rule of conduct imposed by a state or a person for whom a state is responsible causes the
alleged deprivation of rights. Id. Second is whether the party charged with the deprivation of
rights is a state actor. Id.
136. See NOW v. Terry, 886 F.2d 1339, 1361 (2d Cir. 1989) (noting district court's
determination that failure to notify police satisfied state involvement requirement), cert. denied,
110 S. Ct. 2206 (1990).
137. Id.
138. See Nightline, supra note 1 (highlighting instances of local authorities and businesses
supporting Operation Rescue's presence in Wichita).
139. Hall & Wieberg, supra note 5.
140. See Nightline, supra note 1 (noting presence of Kansas Governor Joan Finney at
Operation Rescue demonstrations).
141. See id. (recognizing Governor Finney's support of Operation Rescue's antiabortion
movement).
142. Id.
143. U.S. Marshals Ordered to Clear Out Abortion Protesters,CHI. TRIB., July 30, 1991,
at M5 [hereinafter U.S. Marshals Ordered]. In addition to receiving praise from local government officials, Operation Rescue also formed alliances with Roman Catholic Bishop Eugene
Gerber as well as 84 local pastors during the demonstrations. See Sandra Sanchez, U.S. Judge
Warns Gov, Abortion Foes, USA TODAY, Aug. 6, 1991, at 3A (noting religious support of
Operation Rescue's "Summer of Mercy" in Wichita). Cf. Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S.
267, 273-74 (1963) (treating official statements condemning sit-ins as city law even though city
in reality had no such ordinance on its books and reversing petitioners' convictions accordingly).
Viewing the official commands as discriminatory, the Lombard Court reasoned that the city
deserved the exact same treatment as those localities with ordinances directing the continuation
of segregation. Id. at 273.
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Judge Kelly's subsequent restraining order effectively overruled the Mayor's
instructions. 44 As Operation Rescue's leader Randall Terry observed, Wichita received the antiabortion movement warmly, as evidenced by the many
residents supporting the organization's cause.' 4 Terry also noted the important transition occurring in Wichita (and elsewhere) in which local
leadership, dissatisfied with federal approaches dealing with abortion, was
taking over the highly controversial abortion issue by actively supporting
the antiabortion movement. 46 Because Judge Kelly recognized the significant
impact that these state and local leaders were having on Operation Rescue's
demonstrations and morale, he warned the leaders not to expect immunity
from arrest if they participated in any abortion clinic blockades. 47
Although neither side addressed the state action issue in NOW v.
Operation Rescue, Justice O'Connor suggested one final way to encompass
Operation Rescue's activities under section 1985(3) .4 Her argument turns
upon conspiracies designed "for the purpose of preventing or hindering the
constituted authorities of any State or Territory from giving or securing '1to
49
all persons within such State or Territory the equal protection of the laws.'
Because the goal of Operation Rescue is to prevent abortions, many of its
tactics prevent enforcement officials from effectively ensuring women access
5 0 For example, demonstrators usually overwhelmingly
to abortion clinics.Y
outnumber policemen on the scene.' 5' During the "Summer of Mercy,"
police reportedly arrested over 2,300 antiabortion protesters.5 2 Also, in
many instances, protesters pay their fines upon arrest and return to repeat

144. U.S. Marshals Ordered,supra note 133.
145. See Wilkerson, supra note 7, at 20 (quoting Randall Terry) (noting responsiveness
of Wichita residents during "Summer of Mercy").
146. See Tom Morganthau, Target: Wichita, NawswmEK, Aug. 19, 1991, at 18 (quoting
Randall Terry).
147. See id. (reporting that police arrested at least 70 clergy for participation in abortion
clinic blockades and noting Judge Kelly's warning to any leaders participating not to expect
governmental immunity).
148. See 60 U.S.L.W. 3331, 3332 (U.S. Nov. 5, 1991) (questioning relevance of evidence
under § 1985(3) claim that purpose of Operation Rescue's tactics is to hinder police).
149. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1988); see supra note 29 (setting forth text of § 1985(3)). At
least one circuit has already held, however, contrary to Justice O'Connor's suggested argument
that Operation Rescue's activities might fall within the "for the.purpose of preventing or
hindering" language of § 1985(3), that evidence of interference with the ability of law
enforcement to secure equal access to medical treatment for women seeking abortions is not
sufficient evidence of state action to warrant a remedy under § 1985(3). Volunteer Medical
Clinic, Inc. v. Operation Rescue, 948 F.2d 218, 245 (6th Cir. 1991).
150. See Maraniss, supra note 7 (reporting number of abortions allegedly prevented during
"Summer of Mercy").
151. See Hall & Wieberg, supra note 5 (describing effects of "Summer of Mercy" upon
police force). During the "Summer of Mercy," Operation Rescue's tactic of effectively
outnumbering law enforcement officials forced police in Wichita to work overtime, resulting
in significant city expenditures. See id. (reporting that residents of Wichita collectively face
paying over $500,000 in taxes because of police overtime during summer demonstrations).
152. Colman McCarthy, Overreaction in Wichita, WAsH. POST, Aug. 24, 1991, at A27.
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the identical offense during the same demonstration.1 53 The "Summer of
Mercy" marked the use of a highly controversial tactic, as children participated in the Operation Rescue movement. 154 The antiabortion demonstrations in Wichita physically and mentally exhausted the police force, because
55
of the long hours of work and the stress and intimidation involved.
While a number of states have attempted to regulate abortion by means
of legislation challenging the validity of Roe v. Wade,'56 Kansas is not one
of them.15 7 However, by offering Operation Rescue encouragement in its
antiabortion movement, state leaders in a sense have attempted to prevent
abortions through encouraging the illegal acts of private citizens. 5 The
Justice Department insists that section 1985(3) does not protect women
seeking abortions from abortion clinic protests;159 yet relying on the state
court system to grant discretionary relief seems counterintuitive when authorities in the state support, or at least sympathize with, the antiabortion
movement. By arguing that the federal courts have no jurisdiction to protect
women under section 1985(3), the Justice Department is stating that although
Roe v. Wade is still good law, 60 state leaders, by encouraging unlawful
acts, can ignore the right to have an abortion because the women seeking
abortions are without federal protection.' 16 Prochoice advocates perceive
this latest move by the Justice Department and the Bush Administration
simply as another effort to chip away at Roe v. Wade without an outright
overruling by the Supreme Court. 62

153. 1 Imprisoned, 10 Freed in Abortion Clinic Protests, Cm. TRm., Aug. 13, 1991, at
C3 (noting that law enforcement officials arrested many offenders more than once and that
Judge Kelly threatened to jail repeat offenders).
154. See id. (noting that at least one offender had directed children to lie in front of
moving vehicles at sites of abortion clinics).
155. Morganthau, supra note 146.
156. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
157. See infra note 160 (noting cases challenging Roe decision); Nightline, supra note 1
(observing legality of abortion in Kansas).
158. See supra notes 138-47 and accompanying text (discussing official support and
involvement during "Summer of Mercy").
159. See Nightline, supra note 1 (quoting Jackie Judd of ABC News) (arguing that federal
courts do not have jurisdiction to hear cases involving abortion clinic blockades).
160. See Hall, supra note 4 (recognizing that six abortion cases challenging validity of
Roe v. Wade are currently in federal court system). The jurisdictions that currently have cases
challenging Roe v. Wade and their respective legislative enactments include: Guam, which
passed a law prohibiting abortions except in instances necessary to save the woman's life;
Louisiana, which enacted a law banning abortions except in cases of rape, incest, and saving
the woman's life; Utah, which adopted a law restricting abortions except in situations of rape,
incest, severe fetal deformity, and saving the woman's life; Pennsylvania, which passed a law
establishing parental consent, spousal notification, and a 24-hour waiting period as prerequisites
to having an abortion; North Dakota and Mississippi, which enacted laws designating waiting
periods of 24 and 72 hours, respectively, before permitting an abortion. Id.
161. See supra notes 138-47 and accompanying text (discussing official support and
involvement during "Summer of Mercy").
162. See Nightline, supra note I (quoting Jackie Judd of ABC News) (recognizing decline
of Roe v. Wade's significance during Bush Administration). But see Will Justices Answer the
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For a number of reasons, section 1985(3) should require only a minimal
showing of state action when the basis for the suit is an alleged deprivation
of a woman's right to privacy. 63 First, no matter how courts dress up the
claim, the real underlying right at stake in abortion clinic blockade cases is
the right to privacy. Moreover, basing recoveries upon right to privacy
violations avoids creating gaps in federal protection as the alternative ground
for providing relief under section 1985(3)-interstate travel-is not available
to everyone. Also, because the right to have an abortion is a right belonging
solely to women, any physical interference with the right becomes especially
suspect, *warranting federal intervention at the first sign of state support of
the private infringement. Finally, given Operation Rescue's acknowledgement that it intentionally fills jails or makes agreements with police in an
effort to stymie effective enforcement,' 4 such tactics should trigger the
application of section 1985(3), as the conspiracy's admitted design is to
65
influence and affect state activity.
CONCLUSION

In light of Operation Rescue's abortion clinic blockades during the
"Summer of Mercy" and the level of official support they received, a
federal check upon the group's activities is needed. Because the Equal
Protection Clause requires the uniform application of the laws, 16 section
1985(3) should insulate every woman seeking an abortion from private
conspiratorial activities designed to infringe upon her right when the evidence
shows that such activities are state supported. Given that Roe v. Wade is
still good law, 67 the constitutional right to have an abortion deserves federal

Abortion Question?, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 3, 1992, at 5 (questioning whether Supreme Court will
overrule Roe v. Wade upon hearing oral arguments concerning Pennsylvania's abortion law).
163. See Henn & Del Monaco, supra note 18, at 266 (stating that precedent exists
supporting argument that § 1985(3) requires only minimal state involvement in conspiracies).
164. See id. at 266-67 (describing minimal state involvement requirement); supra notes
150-55 and accompanying text (discussing tactics of Operation Rescue during abortion clinic
blockades).
165. See United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners Local 610 v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825,
833 (1983) (noting required showings of state action when basis for deprived right is Fourteenth
Amendment). When bringing a claim under § 1985(3), a plaintiff satisfies the state action
requirement if the plaintiff proves that the state was involved in the conspiracy or affected by
the conspiracy. Id.
166. See TRIBE, supra note 42, § 16-1, at 1436 (suggesting that equal justice under law
indirectly guards virtually all constitutional values).
167. But see Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 533-35 (1989) (Scalia,
J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgement) (indicating that overturning Roe is
very conceivable); supra note 160 (listing current cases challenging validity of Roe). In Webster,
Justice O'Connor suggested that unless state laws regarding abortion are unduly burdensome,
then the right to privacy is not sufficiently implicated to warrant invalidation of the state
regulations. Webster, 492 U.S. at 525-26 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Furthermore, Justice
Rehnquist, in reference to Roe, noted that stare decisis is not nearly as binding in constitutional
cases as it is in others. Id. at 518.
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protection from illegal conspiratorial infringement. Moreover, section 1985(3)
is the proper mechanism for enforcing this right, based not only upon the
constitutional right to interstate travel, but also, and more appropriately,
upon the constitutional right to privacy. As Professor Ken Gormley observes,
"[iln a world where state action and private conduct often intersect,
Congress is empowered to reach ... discriminatory conduct to assure that
'equal protection' is not just a phrase in the back of the Constitution, but
something which all groups in America can actually enjoy."' 6 To decide
that the federal courts are without jurisdiction to protect women seeking
abortions from antiabortion blockades under section 1985(3) will promote
anarchy and discrimination, as state-supported private citizens, unchecked
by the federal judiciary, conspire to take away constitutionally protected
rights.
GEORGIA M. SuLLIVAN

168. Gormiley, supra note 30, at 587.

